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Abstract
In many countries, taxes on businesses are less progressive than labor income
taxes. This paper provides a justification for this pattern based on adverse selection
that entrepreneurs face in credit markets. Individuals choose between becoming en-
trepreneurs or workers and differ in their skill in both of these occupations. I find
that endogenous cross-subsidization in the credit market equilibrium results in ex-
cessive (insufficient) entry of low-skilled (high-skilled) agents into entrepreneurship.
This gives rise to a corrective role for differential taxation of entrepreneurial profits
and labor income. In particular, a profit tax that is regressive relative to taxes on labor
income restores the efficient occupational choice.
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1 Introduction
In most countries, taxes on entrepreneurs and businesses, such as the corporate income
tax, are less progressive than labor income taxes in the sense that they are typically char-
acterized by flat rather than increasing marginal tax rates. This paper proposes a frame-
work in which such a pattern arises as an optimal policy response to frictions that en-
trepreneurs face in credit markets. The argument is developed in a model in which in-
dividuals can choose between entrepreneurship and paid employment as workers and
have private information about their ability in both of the two occupations. In order to
set up a firm, entrepreneurs have to borrow funds in competitive credit markets that are
affected by adverse selection.1 Whenever there is cross-subsidization between high and
low quality borrowers, this provides excessive incentives for low skilled individuals to
enter entrepreneurship, but insufficient incentives for high ability agents. I show that this
occupational misallocation can be removed by a profit tax that is regressive relative to
labor income taxes, thus counteracting the cross-subsidization in the credit market equi-
librium. Notably, this pattern of tax policy can be justified on efficiency grounds even
without a redistributive or revenue motive for taxation.
The fact that adverse selection can induce the wrong mix of individuals in entrepre-
neurship and paid employment, rather than just an inefficient overall share of entrepre-
neurs in the economy, is driven by multidimensional heterogeneity. The existing litera-
ture, going back to the seminal papers by Stiglitz and Weiss (1976) and De Meza and Webb
(1987), has instead focused on settings where a one-dimensional, privately known ability
type drives occupational choice. In this case, credit market imperfections induce either a
too low or a too high number of agents to become entrepreneurs, depending on whether
ability affects the mean or the riskiness of entrepreneurial returns. This calls for either a
lump-sum subsidy or tax on entrepreneurship (or bank profits) to restore efficiency, but
is unable to explain why profit taxes should be less progressive than labor income taxes.
By contrast, I consider a more general setting in which individuals differ in both their
ability as entrepreneurs and workers, and the two dimensions of private information are
not necessarily perfectly correlated. In this case, adverse selection in credit markets can
distort occupational choice even if the equilibrium level of overall entrepreneurial activity
is at the efficient level. This is because the composition of agents in entrepreneurship is
inefficient, with too many and too few entrepreneurs at the same time. Whereas lump-
sum taxes or subsidies on entrepreneurship are unable to correct this misallocation, I
1See e.g. Evans and Leighton (1989), Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and De Nardi, Doctor, and Krane (2007)
for evidence on the importance of borrowing frictions for entrepreneurship.
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demonstrate that regressive profit taxes are a more flexible corrective instrument that not
only affects the overall level but also the ability mix of agents in the two occupations.
Formally, private heterogeneity is captured in the model by a type vector (θ, φ), where
θ denotes an individual’s entrepreneurial skill and φ the skill as a worker. Entrepreneurial
profits pi are risky and distributed according to some cdf H(pi|θ), where higher θ leads
to better profit distributions. On the other hand, if an individual chooses to become a
worker, her payoff is deterministic and proportional to her skill φ. This structure gener-
ates some frontier φ˜(θ) that determines occupational choice, i.e. the set of types who are
just indifferent between becoming entrepreneurs or workers. All types with φ ≤ φ˜(θ)
become entrepreneurs and all the others workers.
I start with characterizing credit market equilibria in this economy. Competitive banks
offer the funds needed by entrepreneurs to set up a firm in exchange for repayment sched-
ules Rθ(pi). Theorem 1 shows that, under some conditions on the joint distribution of θ
and φ and feasible repayment schemes, the equilibrium involves only a single debt con-
tract R(pi) = min{pi, z} being offered to all types of entrepreneurial ability. This general-
izes the results from the financial contracting literature in settings with moral hazard or
one-dimensional heterogeneity (as reviewed in Proposition 1), in particular Innes (1990,
1993), to the present setting with multidimensional privately observed heterogeneity.
As a result of the cross-subsidization between high and low quality borrowers in the
pooling equilibrium, occupational choice is distorted compared to the efficient allocation
in the sense that the equilibrium frontier φ˜(θ) is a rotation of the efficient one: there are
too many low-θ and too few high-θ entrepreneurs in equilibrium, i.e. φ˜(θ) is too flat.
Since the credit market imperfection therefore does not discourage (or encourage) entry
into entrepreneurship across the board, lump-sum policy instruments suggested in the
existing literature (as summarized in Proposition 3) are unable to address it. Proposition
2 demonstrates, however, that a regressive profit tax, which in expectation subsidizes
high-skilled entrepreneurs and taxes low-skilled ones, can be designed so as to counteract
the effects of cross-subsidization in the credit market and restore the efficient occupational
choice. This points out the role of profit taxation as a more targeted policy instrument that
is able to control the composition of entrepreneurship rather than just its overall level.
I finally extend the model to allow for endogenous labor supply and demand and
thus taxes on workers in addition to entrepreneurs. In this case, progressive taxation of
labor income, together with a flat profit tax, is an alternative policy tool to implement
the efficient occupational choice. Rather than directly counteracting cross-subsidization
in credit markets, it introduces symmetric cross-subsidization among workers. In fact,
Proposition 4 shows that there is a continuum of implementations, ranging from the one
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extreme of a regressive profit tax together with a flat tax on labor income, to the other
extreme of a flat tax on profits and a progressive labor income tax. What matters in all
of these implementations is that profit taxes are regressive relative to taxes on workers.
As mentioned at the beginning, this describes a pattern that can be observed in practice,
since business taxes are indeed less progressive than labor taxes in many countries.
Related literature. The present paper is related to an extensive literature on the role
of government interventions in credit markets with adverse selection. This research has
focused on models with one-dimensional heterogeneity and derived contrasting results
depending on whether entrepreneurial ventures differ in terms of their risk profile or their
expected returns. The most prominent example of the former case is Stiglitz and Weiss
(1976), who point out the possibility of credit rationing and therefore an inefficiently low
number of entrepreneurs in equilibrium when banks are restricted to offering debt con-
tracts. However, De Meza and Webb (1987) have shown that, in fact, equity contracts are
optimal in this setting, which implements the first best and thus eliminates the possibil-
ity of credit rationing. On the other hand, De Meza and Webb (1987) have developed a
model corresponding to the second case, i.e. heterogeneity in expected returns. In this
case, debt financing is optimal and excessive entry into entrepreneurship results if the
outside option is a fixed safe investment. The appropriate policy is therefore to tax rather
than subsidize entrepreneurship. Yet none of these papers addresses the role of multidi-
mensional heterogeneity for equilibrium efficiency.
An important exception is the work by Hellman and Stiglitz (2000), who consider
entrepreneurs that differ in both expected returns and risk. They demonstrate that the
possibility of credit rationing, and thus an inefficiently small amount of entrepreneur-
ship, can reemerge in this setting if there are specialized investors who only offer either
debt or equity contracts and entrepreneurs can obtain financing from only one of these
markets, but not both at the same time. However, the possibility of an inefficient mix of
individuals entering entrepreneurship does not arise in their model, nor do they consider
policy instruments to address the inefficiency, which is the focus of the present paper.
More closely related are the more recent contributions by Parker (2003) and Ghatak,
Morelli, and Sjöström (2007). The present paper shares their approach of viewing the
outside option of entrepreneurs as paid employment rather than a safe investment and
therefore of exploring the role of tax policy as a means to affect occupational choice. How-
ever, the key difference is that both papers focus on settings with one-dimensional het-
erogeneity in privately observed ability. Ghatak, Morelli, and Sjöström (2007) consider
a two-type model and assume that θ and φ are perfectly correlated (they also allow for
heterogeneity in asset holdings, but this dimension is publicly observed). With pooling
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in credit markets, all high-θ types and an inefficiently high share of low-θ types become
entrepreneurs, whereas the remaining low-θ types become workers. As in De Meza and
Webb (1987), a lump-sum tax on entrepreneurs is therefore optimal.2 I show how these
results change when abilities for the two occupations are not perfectly correlated, so that
an occupational misallocation with too many and too few entrepreneurs simultaneously
emerges. The optimal policy then must discourage entry into entrepreneurship for some
types, but encourage it for other types, as achieved by a non-linear profit tax.
Parker (2003) also considers an economy where φ is a function of θ, but allows for
multiple crossings in the relationship so that it no longer necessarily is the case that all
high ability types become entrepreneurs and the others workers. However, even if there
are multiple intervals in the relationship between abilities and occupational choice, there
always exists a one-to-one mapping in the sense that different occupations have income
distributions with non-overlapping supports. Moreover, the tax policies proposed in his
contribution crucially rely on this property. The present paper addresses the difficulties
that arise in the absence of such a one-to-one mapping, which Parker (2003) speculates
about. With two-dimensional heterogeneity, there are both entrepreneurs and workers at
any ability and thus income level, which is an empirically more attractive feature than the
perfect sorting of ability types into occupations under one-dimensional heterogeneity.3
Despite the resulting overlapping income distributions, it turns out that it is possible to
transparently characterize the occupational misallocation and tax policies that correct it.
In particular, none of the above papers derive the (relative) regressivity of profit taxes as
an optimal policy response to the distortions from credit market frictions.
This paper also contributes to the optimal taxation literature that has started to ex-
plicitly account for multidimensional heterogeneity recently, albeit typically in different
contexts. For instance, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009) have considered an application to
the optimal taxation of couples and Choné and Laroque (2010) have characterized opti-
mal taxation with an extensive margin when individuals are characterized both by a skill
type and an additive taste for labor. Relatedly, Scheuer (2012) has characterized the opti-
mal taxation of labor income of workers and profits of entrepreneurs when productivity
in both occupations is determined by a single skill type and there is an additive utility cost
2Moreover, Ghatak, Morelli, and Sjöström (2007) emphasize the role of endogenous wages and output
prices for occupational choice in their setting, giving rise to interesting general equilibrium effects and the
possibility of multiple equilibria. I abstract from endogenous wages and prices in the main part of this
paper, but briefly demonstrate how the model can be extended to account for them in Section 6.
3Parker (1997) provides evidence on a U-shaped relationship between income and the share of en-
trepreneurs, which is strictly between 0 and 1 everywhere. Generating such a pattern requires a model with
multidimensional heterogeneity. See also Gordon (2010) for a one-dimensional adverse selection model of
entrepreneurship and its implications for taxes, with a focus on the tax treatment of debt versus equity.
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of entering entrepreneurship. However, in all these studies, the motivation for taxation
is very different from the current setting. There are no inefficiencies in these models: the
no tax equilibrium is on the constrained Pareto frontier and the only reason for income
taxes is therefore redistribution. Moreover, Scheuer (2012) considers a Mirrlees (1971)
framework with an elastic intensive labor supply margin, so that optimal taxes are cru-
cially shaped by the classic tradeoff between labor distortions and redistributive motives
in addition to occupational choice.4
In contrast, the key role of taxes emphasized in the present paper is corrective: they
are desirable for efficiency reasons even without a redistributive or revenue motive. This
is because I explicitly account for the effect of entrepreneurial borrowing and adverse
selection in credit markets on the equilibrium occupational choice, which is abstracted
from in Scheuer (2012). Moreover, in order to transparently expose the role of an elastic
occupational choice margin, I abstract from endogenous labor supply in the main part
of the present paper (see Section 6.1 for an extension in this direction). As a result, the
regressivity of optimal profit taxes is not driven by a desire to stimulate an intensive effort
margin or to manipulate wages, but entirely by the inefficiency of occupational choice
from endogenous cross-subsidization in the credit market equilibrium without taxes.
More generally, this paper is related to an extensive literature on multidimensional
screening. Most of this literature has focused on monopolistic or duopolistic screening
and the form of the optimal contract when agents differ not only in their valuation of the
good provided by the principal but also in their outside option. Jullien (2000) has ana-
lyzed adverse selection with such type dependent participation constraints when the two
dimensions are perfectly correlated. Rochet and Stole (2002) have generalized this setting
to imperfect correlation and thus full two-dimensional heterogeneity.5 The pooling result
derived in the present paper can be viewed as an extreme form of the results about the
prevalence of bunching in this line of research (see also Rochet and Choné, 1998), even
though the setting considered here, with competition between many principals, is quite
different and in the spirit of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).6 None of these papers have
considered the implications of the resulting cross-subsidization for occupational choice
4Scheuer (2012) also considers the role of endogenous wages for nonlinear income taxation and is mainly
interested in comparing optimal tax schedules under a uniform versus differential tax treatment of en-
trepreneurs and workers. See also Rothschild and Scheuer (2012, 2013) for Mirrleesian optimal tax studies
when individuals can choose between different sectors and are characterized by a fully two-dimensional
skill type, one for each sector, rather than the additive second dimension of heterogeneity considered here.
5See Armstrong and Rochet (1999) and Rochet and Stole (2003) for overviews of this literature.
6Smart (2000) and Netzer and Scheuer (2010) have examined 4-type models with two-dimensional het-
erogeneity in the Rothschild-Stiglitz framework. These papers do not consider endogenous entry into in-
surance markets, however.
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and optimal tax policy.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model
with two-dimensional heterogeneity. Section 3 characterizes the credit market equilib-
rium without taxes. The main result of this section is Theorem 1, which implies cross-
subsidization between borrowers of different qualities in equilibrium. Section 4 ana-
lyzes the effects of this cross-subsidization on the equilibrium occupational choice and
constructs a regressive profit tax system that eliminates this occupational misallocation
(Proposition 2). Section 5 provides a numerical example and Section 6 extends the base-
line model to allow for labor income taxes. Proposition 4 shows that what matters in this
more general framework is that profit taxes are regressive relative to labor income taxes.
Finally, Section 7 concludes. The proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
I consider a unit mass of heterogeneous individuals who are characterized by a two-
dimensional type vector (θ, φ) ∈ Θ × Φ ≡ [θ, θ] × [φ, φ], where θ will be interpreted
as an individual’s skill as an entrepreneur and φ as an individual’s skill as a worker, as
explained in more detail below. θ and φ are assumed to be independently distributed,
where F(θ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of θ and G(φ) the cumulative
distribution function of φ, both assumed to allow for density functions f (θ) and g(φ).
Both θ and φ are an individual’s private information.
Agents can choose between two occupations: they can become a worker, in which case
they obtain the payoff φ according to the second dimension of their skill type. Alterna-
tively, an agent may select to become an entrepreneur. To set up a firm, each entrepreneur
has to make a fixed investment I. Agents are born without wealth and hence have to
borrow these funds from banks in a competitive credit market. Entrepreneurs produce
stochastic profits pi according to some cdf H(pi|θ) that depends on their entrepreneurial
skill θ. In particular, I assume that H(pi|θ) MLRP H(pi|θ′) for θ > θ′, i.e. a higher skilled
entrepreneur has a distribution of pi that is better in the sense of the monotone likelihood
ratio property (MLRP). H(pi|θ) has support Π ≡ [pi,pi] for all θ such that
pi < I < pi and φ = 0, φ ≥
∫
Π
pidH(pi|θ).
The first assumption rules out trivial credit market equilibria where entrepreneurs can
always or never repay the investment outlays I, independent of their profit realization.
The second ensures that, for each θ, there exist some φ-types who become entrepreneurs
and others who choose to be workers in the credit market equilibrium (and this is also
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efficient). An entrepreneur’s realized profits pi are publicly observable.
There is a large number of risk-neutral banks, offering credit contracts that supply
funding I in return for a repayment schedule Rθ(pi).7 The expected utility of an en-
trepreneur of ability type θ from such a contract is then
∫
Π [pi − Rθ(pi)] dH(pi|θ). For a
given credit contract, an individual of skill type (θ, φ) decides to enter entrepreneurship
if and only if ∫
Π
[pi − Rθ(pi)] dH(pi|θ) ≥ φ
and becomes a worker otherwise. I can therefore characterize the occupational choice
decision of all individuals by the critical values
φ˜(θ) ≡ max
{
φ, min
{
φ,
∫
Π
[pi − Rθ(pi)] dH(pi|θ)
}}
such that all (θ, φ) with φ ≤ φ˜(θ) become entrepreneurs and all the others workers. This
also makes clear that occupational choice depends on the (endogenous) credit market
equilibrium {Rθ(pi)}, a key force underlying the results in the following. The above as-
sumptions on the support [φ, φ] make sure that the critical value for occupational choice
φ˜(θ) is always given by an interior value in (φ, φ) in equilibrium.
As a result of two-dimensional heterogeneity in both skill dimensions, there will not
be a perfect ranking between occupational choice and (expected) payoffs: for any given
θ, there are individuals who enter entrepreneurship and others who become workers
due to their different φ-type. This is an empirically attractive implication of the present
specification and in contrast to models where occupational choice is only based on one
dimension of privately observed heterogeneity.8 In that case, it is typically assumed that
one occupation rewards ability relatively more than the other. Then there exists a critical
skill level such that higher skilled agents select into the high-reward occupation, and
lower-ability agents into the other. This would result in income distributions for the two
occupations that somewhat unrealistically occupy non-overlapping intervals.
7I introduce the index θ even though θ is private information since, in a separating equilibrium, banks
may offer different credit contracts to entrepreneurs of different ability levels θ. Of course, any such as-
signment has to be incentive compatible, as specified below. Moreover, note that it is impossible to screen
entrepreneurs based on their φ-type.
8A partial list of such models includes Stiglitz and Weiss (1976), De Meza and Webb (1987), Boadway,
Marceau, and Pestieau (1991), Moresi (1997), Parker (1999, 2003) and Ghatak, Morelli, and Sjöström (2007).
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3 Equilibrium in the Credit Market
I next define and characterize credit market equilibria in the economy introduced in the
preceding section.
Definition 1. A credit market equilibrium is a set of contracts {Rθ(pi)} such that
(i) ∫
Π
(pi − Rθ(pi)) dH(pi|θ) ≥
∫
Π
(pi − Rθ′(pi)) dH(pi|θ) ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, (1)
(ii) ∫
Θ
G(φ˜(θ))
[∫
Π
Rθ(pi)dH(pi|θ)− I
]
dF(θ) ≥ 0 (2)
with
φ˜(θ) =
∫
Π
(pi − Rθ(pi)) dH(pi|θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, and
(iii) there exists no other set of contracts {R˜θ(pi)} that earns strictly positive profits when offered
in addition to {Rθ(pi)} and all individuals select their preferred occupation and preferred contract
from {R˜θ(pi)} ∪ {Rθ(pi)}.
Condition (1) is the set of incentive constraints, which require that each entrepreneur is
willing to select the credit contract Rθ(pi) intended for her. Constraint (2) makes sure that
the set of equilibrium credit contracts make non-negative profits in aggregate when taken
up by the agents who select into entrepreneurship, as given by the critical cost values φ˜(θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ. Finally, the last part of the definition rules out profitable sets of deviating
contract offers. Note that, although the structure of this definition is similar to Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976), it is considerably more general by letting banks offer sets of contracts,
thus allowing for cross-subsidization between different contracts in equilibrium.
Following Innes (1993), I restrict attention to contracts Rθ(pi) that satisfy the following
two properties: First, 0 ≤ Rθ(pi) ≤ pi for all θ ∈ Θ and pi ∈ Π, which is a standard limited
liability constraint. Second, Rθ(pi) is non-decreasing in pi so that, when the entrepreneur
earns higher profits, the repayment received by the bank Rθ(pi) is also higher. This mono-
tonicity constraint has been a standard assumption in the financial contracting literature
since Innes (1990) and Nachman and Noe (1994). It generates more realistic equilibrium
contracts by smoothing sharp discontinuities in repayment schedules and can also be
formally justified, e.g. based on the following hidden side trades (see e.g. chapters 3.6
and 6.6 in Tirole, 2006): if banks can only observe total cash flows, entrepreneurs would
have incentives to increase their profits by costlessly borrowing b > 0 and reporting aug-
mented profits p˜i ≡ pi + b in any decreasing segment of the repayment schedule R˜(p˜i).
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This would give rise to an effective repayment function R(pi) = minp˜i≥pi
{
R˜(p˜i)
}
that
automatically satisfies the monotonicity constraint. Moreover, whenever pi has only two
possible realizations, any repayment scheme that guarantees the bank non-negative prof-
its in equilibrium must be weakly increasing in pi. Note that both of these motivations
for the monotonicity constraint work independently from whether the underlying het-
erogeneity of entrepreneurs is one- or multidimensional.
3.1 One-dimensional Heterogeneity
De Meza and Webb (1987) and Innes (1990, 1993) have characterized credit market equi-
libria under such assumptions in models with moral hazard or one-dimensional private
heterogeneity, as captured by θ. Before demonstrating how their analysis generalizes to
the present setting with two-dimensional private heterogeneity in θ and φ, let me briefly
review their main results by considering the case where only θ is private information but
φ is observable. In this case, there is a credit market for each value of φ, and within each
such market, borrowers differ only in their privately known quality θ. I can therefore just
look at one such market, for a given value of φ, and the equilibrium takes the following
form (see e.g. Innes (1993), Proposition 1):
Proposition 1. When φ is observable, the credit market equilibrium for a given φ is such that
only the single debt contract Rz∗φ(pi) = min{pi, z∗φ} is offered. There is a critical value θ∗φ such
that all types with θ ≥ θ∗φ become entrepreneurs and all the others workers, where θ∗φ solves∫
Π
(pi −min{pi, z∗φ})dH(pi|θ∗φ) = φ (3)
and z∗φ solves ∫ θ
θ∗φ
[∫
Π
min{pi, z∗φ}dH(pi|θ)− I
]
dF(θ) = 0. (4)
The proposition, which is proven in Innes (1993), shows that an equilibrium always
exists and is given by a pooling contract that takes the simple form of a debt contract:
It specifies a fixed repayment level z∗φ, which the entrepreneur has to return to the bank
whenever she can, i.e. whenever pi ≥ z∗φ. Otherwise, the firm goes bankrupt, and the en-
tire amount of profits goes to the bank, with the entrepreneur hitting her liability limit and
thus being left with zero consumption. This results in the contract Rz∗φ(pi) = min{pi, z∗φ},
where z∗φ is such that the banks’ expected profit is zero given the set of agents who en-
ter the credit market for φ when anticipating the equilibrium contract Rz∗φ(pi). This set is
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determined by the threshold θ∗φ and all individuals with ability higher than that become
entrepreneurs and all the low ability agents become workers.
The intuition for this debt contracting result is the following: By the monotone likeli-
hood ratio property, low-skill entrepreneurs have a larger probability weight in low-profit
states. Among all contracts satisfying the monotonicity constraint, debt contracts in turn
are the ones that put the maximal repayment weight in these low-profit states. As a result,
debt contracts are least attractive to low-skill borrowers, and hence any set of deviation
contracts that do not take the debt contract form would attract a lower quality borrower
pool and generate lower profits for banks.
It is worth stressing that the assumption of return distributions ordered by MLRP,
which implies FOSD and hence differences in expected returns, plays an important role
for this result. In contrast, Stiglitz and Weiss (1976) have considered a setting where en-
trepreneurs have private information about the risk of their investment, ranked by SOSD,
but they all have the same expected return. While Stiglitz and Weiss (1976) have confined
attention to debt financing and demonstrated that it can generate credit rationing in equi-
librium, De Meza and Webb (1987) have shown that equity contracts are in fact optimal
in such a model, and they even implement the first best.9
The result is also different from the canonical Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model, in
which a pooling equilibrium is impossible and an equilibrium may fail to exist altogether.
This is because there exist “cream-skimming” deviations that attract profitable types (i.e.
low risk types in the Rothschild-Stiglitz framework) without attracting unprofitable (high
risk) ones in their model. However, this is not possible in the present framework: any de-
viation set of contracts will in fact be more attractive to low quality borrowers than the
equilibrium debt contract, and hence “cream-skimming” attempts only attract unprof-
itable rather than profitable types. In this sense, “cream-skimming” only works in the
wrong direction in the present framework.
3.2 Two-dimensional Heterogeneity
Let me now demonstrate how the debt contracting result generalizes to the present frame-
work withheterogeneity in both θ and φ and both are private information. As the next the-
9On the other hand, De Meza and Webb (1987) have developed an alternative model where en-
trepreneurs differ in expected returns, as ranked by FOSD, and shown that debt contracts are optimal in
this case. Proposition 1, going back to Innes (1993), is a more general result, allowing for a continuum of
possible profit realizations rather than just two and demonstrating that debt financing endogenously arises
as an equilibrium outcome when entrepreneurs differ in expected profits. In particular, while banks could
offer equity contracts (or any other contracts that satisfy the constraints) here, it is not profitable for them
to do so.
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orem shows, a debt contracting equilibrium still obtains under the following assumption
on the distribution of φ.
Assumption 1. g(φ) is non-increasing.
I already assumed that θ and φ are independently distributed from the beginning.
This together with Assumption 1 ensures that the two-dimensional screening problem
that banks face when offering credit contracts remains tractable and the equilibrium takes
the following form.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, the credit market equilibrium with unobservable θ and φ is
such that only the single contract Rz∗(pi) = min{pi, z∗} is offered and z∗ solves∫
Θ
G(φ˜z∗(θ))
[∫
Π
min{pi, z∗}dH(pi|θ)− I
]
dF(θ) = 0 (5)
with
φ˜z∗(θ) =
∫
Π
(pi −min{pi, z∗}) dH(pi|θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ. (6)
Proof. See Appendix A.
When both θ and φ are unobservable, there is only a single credit market for the en-
tire economy and thus pooling occurs over all (θ, φ)-types that become entrepreneurs,
as captured by the zero-profit constraint (5). Moreover, the equilibrium no longer takes
the threshold form in terms of θ as under one-dimensional private heterogeneity: for
any level of entrepreneurial ability θ, there are individuals who enter entrepreneurship
and others who become workers, as determined by the critical cost values φ˜z∗(θ). For-
mally, the share of entrepreneurs conditional on a skill θ who demand a credit contract,
given by G(φ˜z∗(θ)), is now a smooth function of θ valued between zero and one, in con-
trast to the models with one-dimensional heterogeneity. Indeed, when φ was the same
for all individuals in a credit market, then there was some critical value θ∗φ such that
G(φ˜z∗(θ)) = 0 ∀ θ < θ∗φ and G(φ˜z∗(θ)) = 1 otherwise. It is a key advantage of the present
setting with two-dimensional heterogeneity that it can explain the existence of both work-
ers and entrepreneurs in all parts of the skill distribution, including entrepreneurs of low
skill and workers of high skill, rather than the (somewhat stark) perfect sorting of ability
types into occupations in the threshold equilibrium, conditional on observables.10
10See e.g. Parker (1997) for evidence documenting that entrepreneurs are represented both at the high
and low end of the income distribution in the UK. In addition, there is another empirical difference between
the one- and two-dimensional models: consider a bank that offers a debt contract min{pi, z} and increases
z by a small amount. If φ is the same for all entrepreneurs in the credit market, the demand reaction to
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The result in Theorem 1, showing that the equilibrium still involves a debt contract,
as in Proposition 1, goes through even with two-dimensional heterogeneity for two rea-
sons. First, the second dimension of the skill type φ does not affect preferences over
different credit contracts. In other words, an individual’s skill as a worker φ only affects
her occupational choice, but not which credit contract she finds attractive given that she
chooses to be an entrepreneur. The intuition from Innes (1993) about the higher attrac-
tiveness of a debt contract to high-θ types compared to low-θ types, conditional on being
entrepreneurs, therefore extends to the present setting. However, the distribution G(φ)
now matters for bank profits, since it determines how many agents of entrepreneurial skill
θ choose to become entrepreneurs, and also how many of them are attracted into credit
markets by a deviating contract.
The proof of Theorem 1 therefore involves demonstrating that, under the distribu-
tional assumptions of independence between θ and φ and Assumption 1, there still does
not exist a profitable deviation for any bank from the pooling debt contract even though
the number of entrepreneurs of skill θ who demand credit contracts, G(φ˜z∗(θ)) f (θ), is
now endogenous and smooth. Independence and Assumption 1 ensure that any deviat-
ing contract still attracts relatively more low-θ agents into the credit market than high-θ
agents (see Lemmas 3 and 4 in Appendix A). In particular, to prove the theorem, I consider
any set of deviation contracts {Rdθ(pi)} and the resulting critical cost values for occupa-
tional choice
φ˜d(θ) ≡ max
{∫
Π
[pi − Rz∗(pi)] dH(pi|θ),
∫
Π
[
pi − Rdθ(pi)
]
dH(pi|θ)
}
.
Then Lemma 3 in the appendix first shows that the change in critical cost values due to the
deviation ∆φ˜(θ) = φ˜d(θ)− φ˜z∗(θ) is decreasing in θ. This means that low-θ types have
a stronger reaction to any deviation set of contracts in terms of how they are attracted
into the credit market in addition to those already attracted by the original debt contract.
This holds without distributional assumptions. However, to make sure that it translates
into a less favorable pool of borrower qualities for the deviating contract compared to the
posited equilibrium debt contract, the reaction as measured by G, given by ∆G(φ˜(θ)) =
G(φ˜d(θ))− G(φ˜z∗(θ)), must also be decreasing in θ. Since φ˜z∗(θ) is increasing by MLRP,
Lemma 4 shows that independence of θ and φ and concavity of G(φ) are sufficient, even
this change will occur only at the lower end of entrepreneurial abilities who demand credit, since the only
marginal entrepreneur is at the threshold skill θ∗φ, which will drop out of the credit market in response to
the increase in z. In contrast, with private heterogeneity in φ, all critical values φ˜(θ) will decrease when z
increases. Hence, there will be a reduction in demand for all entrepreneurial skill levels θ because there are
marginal borrowers at each quality level. Two-dimensional heterogeneity is therefore key to generate such
smoother demand reactions to price changes.
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though not necessary, for this result.11 Using this, the proof proceeds by showing that
any deviation must therefore attract a borrower pool that is tilted towards lower qualities
than the zero profit pooling debt contract, and therefore cannot be profitable.
4 Occupational Choice and Entrepreneurial Tax Policy
4.1 Inefficiency of Occupational Choice
I now ask whether the no tax equilibrium in this economy involves the efficient occupa-
tional choice. In fact, efficiency would require that a type (θ, φ) becomes an entrepreneur
if and only if ∫
Π
pidH(pi|θ)− I ≥ φ,
i.e. her expected profits minus the investment outlays exceed the payoff from being a
worker φ. This can be solved for the efficient critical cost value
φ˜e(θ) ≡
∫
Π
pidH(pi|θ)− I (7)
for any θ ∈ Θ. Then the following result is a corollary of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. When θ and φ are both unobservable, there exists a unique skill-type θ˜ such that∫
Π min{pi, z∗}dH(pi|θ˜) = I and
φ˜z∗(θ) > φ˜e(θ) ∀θ < θ˜ and φ˜z∗(θ) < φ˜e(θ) ∀θ > θ˜.
Proof. First,
∫
Π min{pi, z∗}dH(pi|θ) is increasing in θ by the monotone likelihood ratio property. Second,
θ˜ exists by the aggregate zero profit constraint (5). Third, by (6) and (7), φ˜e(θ) R φ˜z∗(θ) if and only if∫
Π min{pi, z∗}dH(pi|θ) T I.
Since the credit market equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium, it involves cross-subsidi-
zation across entrepreneurs of different qualities θ. In particular, by the monotone like-
lihood ratio property, banks make higher profits with higher ability entrepreneurs, and
thus by the zero profit condition (5), there exists some critical skill level θ˜ such that banks
11If G(φ) were not concave or depended on θ, it could be that, even though the response of high-θ types
in terms of ∆φ˜(θ) is smaller, their response as measured by ∆G(φ˜(θ)) is larger since g(φ) puts little density
at low φ values (where the low-θ types react strongly in terms of ∆φ˜(θ)) but much density at high φ values
(where high-θ types react little). See Rochet and Stole (2002) for similar conditions to keep tractability in
a two-dimensional monopolistic screening problem where the second dimension of private information
also enters preferences additively. They partially characterize the optimal contract, such as no distortion at
the boundaries of the type space, assuming independence between the two dimensions and a log-concave
distribution for the additive dimension and a uniform distribution for the other.
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make profits with all higher quality entrepreneurs and negative profits with all the others.
But this cross-subsidization implies that, compared to the efficient occupational choice de-
fined in (7), low skilled agents have too strong incentives to set up a firm, and too many
high skill agents stay in the workforce. In other words, the credit market equilibrium gen-
erates occupational misallocation such that there is excessive entry of low ability types
into entrepreneurship, but insufficient entry of high-skilled types. This can be seen most
easily by substituting the equilibrium zero profit condition (5) into equation (7), solving
the former for I:
φ˜e(θ) =
∫
Π
pidH(pi|θ)−
∫
Θ G(φ˜z∗(θ))
∫
Π min {pi, z∗} dH(pi|θ)dF(θ)∫
Θ G(φ˜z∗(θ))dF(θ)
and comparing it with the equilibrium critical values for occupational choice in (6):
φ˜z∗(θ) =
∫
Π
pidH(pi|θ)−
∫
Π
min{pi, z∗}dH(pi|θ).
Notably, this comparison clearly identifies the importance of cross-subsidization as the
source of the inefficiency: If Θ is singleton, for instance, then φ˜z∗(θ) = φ˜e(θ).
It is again useful to compare this misallocation to the case when φ is the same for all
agents, so that there only remains one-dimensional heterogeneity in ability. One way to
generate this case is by assuming that φ is observable, so that there is a separate credit
market for each given φ. Then the following corollary of Proposition 1 shows that the
equilibrium only involves excessive entry into entrepreneurship, with too many low-skill
types receiving funding in the credit market.
Corollary 2. Suppose φ is observable and denote the critical skill level for the efficient occupational
choice by θeφ such that, given φ, ∫
Π
pidH(pi|θeφ)− I = φ. (8)
Then θeφ > θ
∗
φ for any given φ.
Proof. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that θ∗φ ≥ θeφ for some given φ. Recall from (3) that θ∗φ is such
that ∫
Π
pidH(pi|θ∗φ)−
∫
Π
min{pi, z∗φ}dH(pi|θ∗φ) = φ.
Subtracting this from (8) yields∫
Π
min{pi, z∗φ}dH(pi|θ∗φ)− I =
∫
Π
pidH(pi|θ∗φ)−
∫
Π
pidH(pi|θeφ) ≥ 0,
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where the last inequality follows from the assumption that θ∗φ ≥ θeφ and MLRP. Moreover,∫
Π
min{pi, z∗φ}dH(pi|θ)− I ≥
∫
Π
min{pi, z∗φ}dH(pi|θ∗φ)− I ≥ 0
for all θ ≥ θ∗φ, where the first inequality is strict for all θ > θ∗φ by MLRP. Hence, banks would make strictly
positive profits with all entrepreneurs of skill θ > θ∗φ and weakly positive profits with the marginal type θ∗φ,
resulting in overall strictly positive profits. This contradicts the zero profit condition (4).
With one-dimensional heterogeneity, there is unambiguously too much entry into en-
trepreneurship, since in each credit market conditional on φ, the marginal entrepreneur
who still receives funding in equilibrium, with skill θ∗φ, is of lower quality than the effi-
cient level θeφ. This observation has been made first by De Meza and Webb (1987) in a
model where agents choose between a safe investment and a risky project (entrepreneur-
ship) with binary output, and extended to an occupational choice setting by Ghatak,
Morelli, and Sjöström (2007).12 This extreme case is quite in contrast to the seminal anal-
ysis by Stiglitz and Weiss (1976), who emphasized credit rationing and thus insufficient
entry into entrepreneurship in a model where entrepreneurs differ in the riskiness of their
projects rather than expected returns.
The present model demonstrates that, with two-dimensional heterogeneity, the occu-
pational inefficiency can take both forms simultaneously, as there are too many and too
few entrepreneurs of different skill types. In fact, the overall level of entrepreneurship can
no longer be considered to evaluate the efficiency or inefficiency of the equilibrium. The
total share of entrepreneurs in equilibrium may be equal to the efficient level, i.e.∫
Θ
G(φ˜z∗(θ))dF(θ) =
∫
Θ
G(φ˜e(θ))dF(θ),
but the equilibrium occupational choice would still be inefficient because the wrong mix
of individuals are in the two occupations. This will be further illustrated in the numerical
example in Section 5. It also demonstrates that, most generally, if different occupations
are affected by different degrees of cross-subsidization, this makes the equilibrium occu-
pational choice decisions inefficient.
12The latter in fact consider a two type model with θ ∈ {θL, θH} and assume that the skill as an en-
trepreneur and a worker are perfectly correlated with φ(θH) < φ(θL). This effectively reduces private
heterogeneity to one dimension as well with the result that, in the relevant equilibria, all θH-types and an
inefficiently high share of the θL-types become entrepreneurs.
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4.2 Regressive Profit Taxation
In the following, I show that there is a simple entrepreneurial tax policy that eliminates
this occupational misallocation. Suppose the government introduces a (possibly non-
linear) entrepreneurial profit tax T(pi), so that an entrepreneur’s after-tax profits are given
by pˆi ≡ pi − T(pi). Banks and entrepreneurs, taking the tax schedule T(pi) as given,
then write contracts contingent on these after-tax profits pˆi, and I can define the result-
ing credit market equilibrium for any given tax policy just as in Definition 1, replacing
pi by pˆi. Moreover, I keep assuming that contracts Rθ(pˆi) must satisfy the limited lia-
bility constraint 0 ≤ Rθ(pˆi) ≤ pˆi and the monotonicity constraint that Rθ(pˆi) is non-
decreasing in pˆi.13 Under these conditions, it is known from Theorem 1 that the credit
market equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium with only a debt contract being offered if the
after-tax profits pˆi satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property with respect to θ, so that
Hˆ(pˆi|θ) MLRP Hˆ(pˆi|θ′) for θ > θ′, where Hˆ(pˆi|θ) is the cdf of after-tax profits for type θ.
The following lemma provides a condition on the tax schedule T(pi) for this to hold.
Lemma 1. Suppose H(pi|θ) MLRP H(pi|θ′) for θ > θ′, θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, and T(pi) is such that
pˆi = pi − T(pi) is increasing. Then Hˆ(pˆi|θ) MLRP Hˆ(pˆi|θ′).
Proof. Since pˆi ≡ Γ(pi) ≡ pi− T(pi) and Γ(pi) is increasing, the following relation between Hˆ(pˆi|θ)
and H(pi|θ) is true:
Hˆ(Γ(pi)|θ) = H(pi|θ) ∀pi ∈ Π, θ ∈ Θ
and equivalently
Hˆ(pˆi|θ) = H(Γ−1(pˆi)|θ) ∀pˆi ∈ Πˆ, θ ∈ Θ.
Differentiating with respect to pˆi, I therefore obtain
hˆ(pˆi|θ) = h(Γ
−1(pˆi)|θ)
Γ′(Γ−1(pˆi))
∀pi ∈ Πˆ, θ ∈ Θ. (9)
By assumption, H(pi|θ) satisfies MLRP, which means that h(pi|θ)/h(pi|θ′) is increasing in pi for
θ > θ′. Equation (9) yields
hˆ(pˆi|θ)
hˆ(pˆi|θ′) =
h(Γ−1(pˆi)|θ)/Γ′(Γ−1(pˆi))
h(Γ−1(pˆi)|θ′)/Γ′(Γ−1(pˆi)) =
h(Γ−1(pˆi)|θ)
h(Γ−1(pˆi)|θ′) ,
which is increasing in Γ−1(pˆi) by the assumption that H(pi|θ) satisfies MLRP. Then the result fol-
13The idea behind this is that the government has no superior ability to extract tax payments from a
firm in case of bankruptcy compared to banks, so that is must always hold that pi − T(pi) − R(pi) ≥ 0,
where R(pi) is the repayment to the bank. In addition, when T(pi) is negative, it is assumed that banks can
capture this transfer from the government in case of bankruptcy, so that R(pi) ≤ pi− T(pi). In other words,
tax payments are fully pledgeable.
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lows from the fact that Γ−1(pˆi) is an increasing function since pˆi = Γ(pi) = pi − T(pi) is increas-
ing.
Lemma 1 considers entrepreneurial profit tax schedules that involve marginal tax rates
uniformly less than one, so that after-tax profits are increasing in before-tax profits. This
is a weak restriction on tax policy that I assume to be satisfied in the following. The
lemma shows that, under this condition, the fact that higher θ-types have better before-
tax profit distributions in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property translates
into the same ordering of after-tax profit distributions. This is intuitive since such a profit
tax preserves the ranking of before-tax profit levels and applies to all θ-types equally.
Combined with Theorem 1, Lemma 1 then implies that, whenever the government im-
poses a tax on entrepreneurial profits T(pi) that involves marginal tax rates less than
one, the resulting credit market equilibrium with this tax will be a single debt contract
Rz∗T(pˆi) = min{pˆi, z∗T}, where z∗T is such that banks make zero profits in aggregate:∫
Θ
G(φ˜z∗T ,T(θ))
[∫
Π
min{pi − T(pi), z∗T}dH(pi|θ)− I
]
dF(θ) = 0. (10)
Here,
φ˜z∗T ,T(θ) =
∫
Π
(pi − T(pi)−min{pi − T(pi), z∗T}) dH(pi|θ) (11)
denotes the critical φ-value for entry into entrepreneurship at θ when the tax policy T(pi)
is in place.
Now suppose the government sets the profit tax schedule T(pi) such that, for all θ ∈ Θ,
∫
Π
T(pi)dH(pi|θ) = −
(∫
Π
min{pi − T(pi), z∗T}dH(pi|θ)− I
)
. (12)
Substituting equation (12) into (11) yields φ˜z∗T ,T(θ) = φ˜e(θ) for all θ, so that the policy is
exactly counteracting the cross-subsidization in the credit market, providing the efficient
incentives for entry into entrepreneurship to all agents.14 Note that equation (12) is a
fixed point condition, since for any given profit tax schedule T(pi), we can compute the
equilibrium debt contract z∗T from solving equations (10) and (11), and given z
∗
T, the tax
14From a bank’s perspective, of course, there is still cross-subsidization since net profits
∫
Π min{pi −
T(pi), z∗T}dH(pi|θ) − I vary with θ, and hence banks still make profits with high-θ and losses with low-θ
types in the pooling equilibrium with taxes. However, T(pi) is such that there is no cross-subsidization
from the perspective of entrepreneurs any longer, which is what determines occupational choice.
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policy must satisfy equation (12). Total revenue from the profit tax is then given by∫
Θ
G(φ˜z∗T ,T(θ))
∫
Π
T(pi)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ)
= −
∫
Θ
G(φ˜z∗T ,T(θ))
(∫
Π
min{pi − T(pi), z∗T}dH(pi|θ)− I
)
dF(θ) = 0,
where the first equality follows from equation (12) and the second from the zero profit
condition (10). Hence, the government budget constraint is automatically satisfied with
equality and the tax policy T(pi) is feasible. The following proposition summarizes these
results:
Proposition 2. Suppose that both θ and φ are unobservable and an entrepreneurial tax policy
T(pi) is introduced that is such that pi − T(pi) is increasing and equation (12) is satisfied for all
θ ∈ Θ. Then
(i) the resulting credit market equilibrium is such that φ˜z∗T ,T(θ) = φ˜e(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, where
φ˜z∗T ,T(θ) and φ˜e(θ) are given by (11) and (7), respectively, and
(ii) the government budget is balanced.
By (12), the efficient entrepreneurial tax policy is regressive in the sense that higher
ability entrepreneurs face a lower expected tax payment. In fact, for all θ > θ˜T with θ˜T
such that
∫
Π min {pi − T(pi), z∗T} dH(pi|θ˜T) = I, the expected tax payment is negative.
This is because the profit tax has to counteract the equilibrium cross-subsidization in the
credit market, which is decreasing in θ as argued above. By the monotone likelihood ratio
property of H(pi|θ), this pushes towards a tax schedule T(pi) that is itself decreasing in pi
and in that sense regressive as well. This makes the assumption in Lemma 1 that pi−T(pi)
is increasing even less restrictive, and will be further illustrated in the next section.
It is worth emphasizing that the entrepreneurial tax policy in Proposition 2 is quite
different from the general subsidization of entrepreneurship that one may think of at
first glance in view of credit market frictions. As shown by Ghatak, Morelli, and Sjöström
(2007), even if there is only one-dimensional heterogeneity in entrepreneurial abilities, the
resulting excessive entry into entrepreneurship in this case would in fact require a lump
sum tax on entrepreneurial profits, rather than a subsidy. This can be seen in the present
framework by again considering the case where φ is observable. Then for each given φ,
I can set a lump sum tax Tφ on all entrepreneurs that restores the efficient occupational
choice as follows. Note first that any such tax Tφ induces a credit market equilibrium as
before, with the only difference that the marginal entrepreneur is now of quality θ∗φ(Tφ)
such that ∫
Π
(pi −min{pi, z∗φ(Tφ)})dH(pi|θ∗φ(Tφ))− Tφ = φ (13)
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and the repayment amount z∗φ(Tφ) specified in the equilibrium debt contract solves the
zero profit condition
∫ θ
θ∗φ(Tφ)
(∫
Π
min{pi, z∗φ(Tφ)}dH(pi|θ)− I
)
dF(θ) = 0. (14)
In order to obtain efficiency of occupational choice, the lump sum tax Tφ is set so as to
achieve θ∗φ(Tφ) = θeφ and hence (comparing (8) and (13))
Tφ = −
(∫
Π
min{pi, z∗φ(Tφ)}dH(pi|θ∗φ(Tφ))− I
)
. (15)
Note that equation (15) is again a fixed point condition, since for any given lump-sum tax
Tφ, we can derive the resulting credit market equilibrium as characterized by θ∗φ(Tφ) and
z∗φ(Tφ) solving equations (13) and (14), and given this, Tφ has to satisfy equation (15). I
summarize these insights in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose that φ is observable and a lump-sum tax Tφ is imposed on all en-
trepreneurs in the credit market for φ. If Tφ satisfies (15), then
(i) the resulting credit market equilibrium is such that θ∗φ(Tφ) = θeφ as given by (8) and (13), and
(ii) Tφ > 0.
Proof. Part (i) immediately follows from substituting (15) into (13). To prove part (ii), suppose that Tφ ≤ 0
and hence, by (15), ∫
Π
min{pi, z∗φ(Tφ)}dH(pi|θ∗φ(Tφ))− I ≥ 0.
Then ∫
Π
min{pi, z∗φ(Tφ)}dH(pi|θ)− I ≥ 0
for all θ ≥ θ∗φ(Tφ) by MLRP, with strict inequality for all θ > θ∗φ(Tφ). Thus, banks would make profits with
all entrepreneurs in the market for φ, and strictly so with almost all of them. This would contradict the
overall zero profit condition (14).
With one-dimensional private heterogeneity, a strictly positive lump-sum tax Tφ on
all entrepreneurs would be able to restore the efficient occupational choice. Clearly, the
resulting positive tax revenue (1− F(θ∗φ(Tφ)))Tφ could be rebated lump-sum to all agents
of type φ, entrepreneurs and workers, without changing any of the results. In contrast,
the occupational inefficiency with two-dimensional heterogeneity does not just involve
excessive entry into entrepreneurship, so such a uniform tax on entrepreneurs turns out
not to be optimal in general.
The optimal policy T(pi) also differs from the tax on bank profits that De Meza and
Webb (1987) propose in order to deal with the excessive entry into entrepreneurship that
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they find in their model with one-dimensional heterogeneity. As can be seen from the zero
profit condition (14), a tax on bank profits and a lump-sum tax on entrepreneurship have
equivalent effects. Thus, a tax on bank profits is not able (nor necessary) to restore occu-
pational efficiency in the present setting. Instead, Proposition 2 points out the importance
of entrepreneurial profit taxation as a more targeted corrective instrument. In particular,
in contrast to the policies suggested in the literature, it is able to affect the composition of
agents who become entrepreneurs rather than just the overall level of entrepreneurship
in the economy, which is crucial in the present framework.
5 A Numerical Illustration
In this section, I provide a numerical example that illustrates the computation and prop-
erties of the corrective profit tax schedule. I consider θ ∈ [0, 1] where F(θ) is uniform. The
entrepreneurial profit distributions are such that
h(pi|θ) = 2(1− θ)pi − θpi − (1− 2θ)pi
(pi − pi)2 , ∀θ ∈ [0, 1], pi ∈ [pi,pi],
which satisfies the MLRP property. The left panel in Figure 1 depicts the corresponding
cdfs for a selection of four θ-values. φ is assumed to follow an exponential distribution
with support [0,∞). I set Π = [10, 20] and I = 13. Note that the conditions from the
previous sections, including Assumption 1, are satisfied by this parametrization.
I start with computing the no tax equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1. This is done
by finding the repayment level z∗ such that overall bank profits are zero, as required by
equation (5), taking into account the endogenous occupational choice defined in equation
(6). The right panel in Figure 1 plots aggregate profits as a function of z ∈ [pi,pi]. As can
be seen from the graph, aggregate bank profits are increasing in z and there is a unique
value z∗ = 13.63 such that they are zero.
I next compare the equilibrium occupational choice, described by the critical values
φ˜z∗(θ), with the efficient occupational choice φ˜e(θ). Both functions are shown in the left
panel of Figure 2. As shown in Corollary 1, the frontier for the equilibrium occupational
choice is a clockwise rotation of the efficient frontier, i.e. the equilibrium involves too
many low-skilled but too few high-skilled entrepreneurs, and vice versa for workers.
This misallocation, however, is not reflected in the overall shares of entrepreneurs in the
economy: They are given by 63.2% in the equilibrium and by 62.4% under the efficient oc-
cupational choice, and thus very close together in the two situations. This demonstrates
how misguiding it can be to look at the overall level of entrepreneurial activity as a mea-
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Figure 1: Profit distributions H(pi|θ) and credit market equilibrium z∗ without taxes.
sure of efficiency, rather than its composition as emphasized in this paper.
To compute the profit tax schedule that corrects this occupational misallocation, I fol-
low an iterative procedure starting from the no tax equilibrium from Theorem 1. In partic-
ular, I start with z0 = z∗ computed above and the initial tax schedule T0(pi) = 0 ∀pi ∈ Π
and compute the right-hand side of equation (12). Then I find a new tax schedule T1(pi)
that satisfies condition (12), i.e.15
∫
Π
T1(pi)dH(pi|θ) = −
(∫
Π
min{pi − T0(pi), z0}dH(pi|θ)− I
)
∀θ ∈ Θ. (16)
Given this new tax schedule T1(pi), I find the new credit market equilibrium, as summa-
rized by z1 satisfying equations (10) and (11). Once z1 has been found, it is used together
with T1(pi) to compute an updated value of the right-hand side of equation (16), and to
find an updated tax schedule T2(pi) that satisfies (16). These steps are repeated until a
fixed point is reached. The constraint T(pi) ≤ pi is imposed in all steps.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the resulting profit tax schedule T(pi), as well as
before tax profits pi and after tax profits pi − T(pi). By construction, the equilibrium with
profit taxes T(pi) implements the efficient occupational choice φ˜e(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ and gener-
ates zero tax revenues. Moreover, the graph demonstrates that T(pi) is regressive and
decreasing over most of the range of possible profit realizations. It taxes away almost
all profits if they turn out to be very low, but on the other hand subsidizes high profit
realizations. Clearly, after tax profits pˆi = pi − T(pi) are increasing as a result and there-
15This substep is computed by discretizing Θ and Π in n = 1000 possible realizations and finding a
solution of the system of n linear equations in n unknowns given by condition (12).
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Figure 2: Occupational choice φ˜z∗(θ) vs. φ˜e(θ) and regressive profit taxes T(pi).
fore the tax schedule is consistent with the assumption underlying Lemma 1. They now
range from 0 to 49.97, and new equilibrium repayment level consequently increases to
z∗T = 20.73. This illustrates that the credit market equilibrium, not just the occupational
choice, is significantly affected by the entrepreneurial tax policy.
Finally, I compare the results to the case with one-dimensional private heterogeneity,
when φ is observable. The left panel in Figure 3 illustrates the very different nature of
occupational misallocation in this case: There is excessive entry into entrepreneurship in
this case since θ∗φ < θeφ for all φ as demonstrated in Corollary 2. The right panel depicts
the optimal lump sum taxes Tφ that are sufficient to implement the efficient occupational
choice in this case, characterized in Proposition 3. They are computed using a similar
iterative procedure as used for the optimal profit tax: for each φ, I start with the no tax
equilibrium from Proposition 1, so that Tφ,0 = 0. Then I find the new lump sum tax Tφ,1
by setting it equal to the right-hand side of equation (15). For this new tax, I then compute
the new credit market equilibrium θ∗φ(Tφ,1), z∗φ(Tφ,1) as determined by equations (13) and
(14), and so on. As can be seen from the figure, all these lump sum taxes are positive,
illustrating the result in Proposition 3. For the chosen parameters and distributions, they
turn out to be decreasing in φ since the excessive entry into entrepreneurship is more
pronounced for types with lower values of φ.
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6 Extensions
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the results derived so far are affected in
a richer environment that allows for redistributive taxes on the labor income of workers.
I therefore explicitly include endogenous labor supply and labor markets into the model
considered so far and demonstrate that the results are unchanged by this generalization. I
then use this extension to discuss the effect of redistribution among workers on profit tax-
ation and point out that what matters for implementing the efficient occupational choice
is that the profit tax is regressive relative to redistributive taxes on labor income. I finally
briefly discuss how the results extend to the case where entrepreneurs can offer collateral
in case of default.
6.1 Labor Market Equilibrium
I briefly demonstrate how to include labor markets into the present framework. This ex-
tension is necessary in order to address taxes on labor income since, in the model so far,
a worker’s payoff φ was assumed to be private information, ruling out incentive compat-
ible redistribution among workers. I show in the following that the model equivalently
applies to the standard optimal taxation framework where φ is a worker’s unobservable
skill, but labor income is observable.
Formally, suppose that workers supply labor l and obtain utility wφl − h(l), where
w is the wage and thus wφ is the effective wage of a worker of skill φ, and h(l) is some
increasing and convex disutility of labor. For any given wage w, workers then supply
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labor lw(φ) optimally and obtain indirect utility Vw(φ), which is strictly increasing in φ.
Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, hire an amount of labor L and, after having made the
fixed investment I, produce output using some concave technology Y(L). Their profits
are given by pi = Y(L)−wL+ ε, where ε is some stochastic profit component distributed
according to the cdf Hε(ε|θ). Observe that this implies that, for any given set of credit
contracts {Rθ(pi)}, all entrepreneurs hire the same amount of labor such that Y′(L) = w.
Hence, if Hε satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, for any wage w I can work
directly with the resulting distribution of profits pi ∼ Hw(pi|θ), with the only difference
that it is now a function of w.
For any given wage w, the model therefore works exactly as before when replacing
H(pi|θ) by Hw(pi|θ) and φ by Vw(φ). In particular, for a given w, the credit market equi-
librium is defined as in Definition 1, where the critical value for occupational choice φ˜w(θ)
now solves
Vw(φ) =
∫
pi
(pi − Rθ(pi)) dHw(pi|θ) (17)
for all θ ∈ Θ. Given the cross-subsidization in the credit market equilibrium, there is thus
the same occupational misallocation and the same structure of corrective profit taxation
as discussed in Section 4 for any given wage. To see this, observe that the equilibrium
occupational choice under the tax schedule T(pi) and given the wage w will now be de-
termined by the critical value
φ˜z∗T ,T,w(θ) = V
−1
w
(∫
Π
(pi − T(pi)−min{pi − T(pi), z∗T}) dHw(pi|θ)
)
whereas the efficient critical value would be
φ˜e,w(θ) = V−1w
(∫
Π
pidHw(pi|θ)− I
)
, (18)
so that setting T(pi) as required by (12) still implements φ˜z∗T ,T,w(θ) = φ˜e,w(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
In particular, this also holds for the equilibrium wage w∗, which is such that the labor
market clears, i.e.
∫
Θ
G(φ˜w∗(θ))L(w∗)dF(θ) =
∫
Θ
∫ φ
φ˜w∗ (θ)
g(φ)lw∗(φ)dF(θ),
where L(w∗) solves Y′(L) = w∗. This demonstrates that the previous results can be ex-
tended to this more general framework with endogenous labor supply in a straightfor-
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ward way.16 Notably, since the analysis can be performed for any given wage w, let me
suppress dependence on w in the following to simplify notation.
6.2 Relative Degrees of Cross-Subsidization and Regressivity
Let me now consider the case of progressive redistribution among workers, as for instance
implemented by some progressive income tax Ty(y) with y ≡ wφl, so that workers no
longer obtain utility V(φ) as in the preceding subsection but instead some increasing but
concave transformation Ψ(V(φ)) of it, where Ψ is such that there is some V∗ with
Ψ(V) ≥ V for all V ≤ V∗ and Ψ(V) ≤ V otherwise. (19)
Condition (19), which is assumed for the sake of clarity, captures the notion of progres-
sive redistribution in the sense that low ability workers, with low V(φ) in the no tax
equilibrium, benefit from an increase in utility and vice versa for high ability workers.
By equation (17), the equilibrium occupational choice is now determined by the critical
value
φ˜z∗T ,T(θ) = V
−1
(
Ψ−1
(∫
Π
(pi − T(pi)−min{pi − T(pi), z∗T}) dH(pi|θ)
))
, (20)
whereas the efficient one is still given by (18). The following proposition provides a de-
composition of the corrective profit tax in this case.
Proposition 4. Suppose workers obtain utility Ψ(V(φ)), where both Ψ(V) and V(φ) are in-
creasing. If the entrepreneurial profit tax T(pi) is such that
(i) pi − T(pi) is increasing in pi and
(ii)∫
Π
T(pi)dH(pi|θ) =−
(∫
Π
min{pi − T(pi), z∗T}dH(pi|θ)− I
)
+
(
V(φ˜e(θ))−Ψ(V(φ˜e(θ)))
)
(21)
for all θ ∈ Θ, then it implements the efficient occupational choice with φ˜z∗,T(θ) = φ˜e(θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Equalizing the left-hand sides of equations (18) and (20) yields, after applying first V(φ)
16See Ghatak, Morelli, and Sjöström (2007) and Scheuer (2012) for an analysis of entrepreneurial taxation
in view of general equilibrium effects through wages.
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and then Ψ(V) on both sides of the equation and rearranging,
∫
Π
T(pi)dH(pi|θ) = −
(∫
Π
min{pi − T(pi), z∗T}dH(pi|θ)− I
)
+
∫
Π
pidH(pi|θ)− I −Ψ
(∫
Π
pidH(pi|θ)− I
)
.
Next, using equation (18), the second line above can be rewritten as
V(φ˜e(θ))−Ψ(V(φ˜e(θ))),
which leads to (21).
The first term in (21) is familiar from equation (12) in Section 4, requiring the profit
tax to counteract cross-subsidization in the credit market. The second term, however, is
new and captures the effects of redistribution among workers on occupational choice.
In particular, it is negative for all θ ≤ θ∗ and positive otherwise under condition (19),
with θ∗ such that V(φ˜e(θ∗)) = V∗. This new component of the profit tax therefore goes
in the opposite direction than the first and familiar component and makes the profit tax
less regressive than if there were no redistribution among workers. The reason is that
progressive redistribution among workers by itself induces an occupational choice with
too many low-skilled and too few high-skilled workers (in terms of φ). This may partly
undo or even cancel out the opposite occupational misallocation resulting from cross-
subsidization in the credit market.
Proposition 4 gives rise to the following two key insights from this model extension.
First, progressive redistribution among workers is an alternative policy tool to deal with
occupational choice distortions from cross-subsidization in credit markets. Rather than
counteracting this cross-subsidization directly through profit taxes, it introduces a sym-
metric cross-subsidization among workers to restore the efficient occupational choice. In
fact, one may construct a progressive labor income tax Ty(y), inducing a transformation
Ψ(V), such that the first and second term on the right-hand side of equation (21) just
cancel when T(pi) = 0 for all pi ∈ Π.
Second, it demonstrates that the efficient occupational choice can be implemented by
a continuum of tax policies, ranging from a regressive profit tax together with a flat tax
on labor income, to the other extreme of a progressive labor income tax and a flat profit
tax. What matters in all of those implementations is that the profit tax is always regres-
sive relative to the labor income tax schedule (or equivalently, that it is less progressive
than redistribution among workers). This is particularly evident from the decomposi-
tion in equation (21), where the second term matches the progressivity of redistribution
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among workers, whereas the first term captures the additional regressive component in
profit taxes that was studied in isolation in Section 4. It also describes a pattern that can
frequently be observed in practice. Indeed, entrepreneurial or business taxes are less pro-
gressive than labor income taxes in most countries. The present paper points at the role
of adverse selection in credit markets as a novel justification for this structure of policy.
At the most general level, the above results indicate that, in an economy with different
occupations that are affected by cross-subsidization to different degrees, occupations for
which there is more cross-subsidization should face relatively more regressive, or less
progressive, tax schedules.
6.3 Collateral
Finally, I briefly discuss how the main results extend to the case where entrepreneurs
can offer collateral for their credit contracts.17 Let me assume, as in Ghatak, Morelli, and
Sjöström (2007), that individuals have wealth a, with distribution Γ(a), which is illiquid,
i.e. it cannot be used to directly finance part of the investment I, but can be offered as
collateral to a bank in case of default. If an entrepreneur offers collateral of amount c, it is
worth ξc to the bank if it collects it, with ξ < 1.
Since wealth is observable, there will be a credit market for each wealth class a and
I can consider one such class, in which individuals only differ in θ and φ as before. In
this class, banks can ask for collateral up to a in case of default, which is worth ξa to
them. By the same logic as in Section 3, the equilibrium contract involves putting the
maximal repayment weight in low profit states in order to attract high quality borrowers.
Hence, banks will ask for the maximal collateral and the equilibrium debt contract takes
the form R(pi) = min{pi+ a, z∗a} in terms of what entrepreneurs have to pay (banks obtain
min{pi + ξa, z∗a}), where z∗a solves∫
Θ
G(φ˜(θ))
(∫
Π
min{pi + ξa, z∗a}dH(pi|θ)− I
)
dF(θ) = 0
with
φ˜(θ) =
∫
Π
(pi −min{pi + a, z∗a}) dH(pi|θ)−Vw ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Hence, up to these modifications, the equilibrium takes the same form as before and the
efficiency and tax policy implications remain unchanged as well. Of course, the risk of
losing the wealth a in case of default makes entrepreneurship less attractive than before,
17I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension.
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so there will be less entry into entrepreneurship, especially for low-θ types.18
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the non-linear taxation of profits in a private information econ-
omy with endogenous firm formation. I have pointed out that a differential tax treatment
of profits can be justified based on corrective arguments, mitigating occupational misal-
location that results from credit market frictions. More generally, the role of tax policies
that are able to affect the mix of individuals entering into entrepreneurship, rather than
only the aggregate number of entrepreneurs, has been emphasized. This is because in a
setting with multidimensional heterogeneity, the overall level of entrepreneurial activity
is no longer a sufficient statistic for the efficiency of occupational choice.
Even though the proposed framework provides an efficiency based justification for
the observed pattern that business taxes are typically less progressive than labor income
taxes, the analysis has abstracted from several potentially important aspects of entrepre-
neurship and its implications for tax policy. Notably, income effects and risk aversion,
capital accumulation and additional choices available to entrepreneurs, such as the deci-
sion whether to incorporate or not, have been neglected. An exploration of how some of
these issues may affect the properties of optimal policy is left for future research.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
By construction, the proposed equilibrium contract Rz∗(pi) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Defi-
nition 1, and thus only requirement (iii) remains to be checked. I will do so by proving a series of
lemmas, starting with the following result due to Innes (1993).
Lemma 2. Consider an arbitrary non-debt contract R(pi) that satisfies the limited liability and monotonic-
ity constraints, and let Rzθ (pi) ≡ min{pi, zθ} denote the debt contract such that∫
Π
R(pi)dH(pi|θ) =
∫
Π
Rzθ (pi)dH(pi|θ)
for some θ ∈ Θ. Then ∫
Π
R(pi)dH(pi|θ′) ≤
∫
Π
Rzθ (pi)dH(pi|θ′) ∀θ′ ≤ θ.
In words, whenever banks offer a debt contract Rzθ (pi) that involves the same expected re-
payment for entrepreneurs of ability θ as the non-debt contract R(pi), then the expected repay-
ment from the debt contract Rzθ (pi) is at least as high as from the non-debt contract R(pi) for all
entrepreneurs of a lower skill θ′ ≤ θ. This result immediately follows from the fact that the en-
trepreneurs’ profit distributions are ranked by MLRP and that, among the contracts that satisfy
the limited liability and monotonicity constraints, debt contracts put the maximal repayment in
low profit states. Note that Lemma 2 also immediately implies∫
Π
[pi − R(pi)] dH(pi|θ′) ≥
∫
Π
[pi − Rzθ (pi)] dH(pi|θ′) ∀θ′ ≤ θ,
i.e. all entrepreneurs of quality less than θ prefer the non-debt contract R(pi) to the debt contract
Rzθ (pi). Clearly, this is independent of the type dimension φ.
Suppose that, in the presence of the equilibrium contract Rz∗(pi), a bank offers an arbitrary,
incentive compatible set of deviation contracts {Rdθ(pi)}. Let me denote the resulting critical cost
values for occupational choice by φ˜d(θ), i.e. for all θ ∈ Θ,
φ˜d(θ) ≡ max
{∫
Π
[pi − Rz∗(pi)] dH(pi|θ),
∫
Π
[
pi − Rdθ(pi)
]
dH(pi|θ)
}
. (22)
Next, the following auxiliary result is useful.
Lemma 3. For all θ ∈ Θ, let ∆φ˜(θ) ≡ φ˜d(θ) − φ˜z∗(θ) denote the change in critical cost values for
occupational choice due to the deviation. Then ∆φ˜(θ) is decreasing in θ.
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Proof. Showing that ∆φ˜(θ) ≡ φ˜d(θ) − φ˜z∗(θ) is decreasing in θ is, by (6) and (22), equivalent to
showing that ∫
Π
Rdθ(pi)dH(pi|θ)−
∫
Π
Rz∗(pi)dH(pi|θ)
is increasing in θ. To see this, note that, by Lemma 2, if
∫
Π R
d
θ(pi)dH(pi|θ) =
∫
Π Rz∗(pi)dH(pi|θ) for
some θ, then
∫
Π R
d
θ(pi)dH(pi|θ′) ≤
∫
Π Rz∗(pi)dH(pi|θ′) for all θ′ ≤ θ, which implies that∫
Π
Rdθ(pi)dH(pi|θ)−
∫
Π
Rz∗(pi)dH(pi|θ) ≥
∫
Π
Rdθ(pi)dH(pi|θ′)−
∫
Π
Rz∗(pi)dH(pi|θ′) (23)
whenever θ ≥ θ′. Moreover, by incentive compatibility of {Rdθ(pi)},∫
Π
[
pi − Rdθ′(pi)
]
dH(pi|θ′) ≥
∫
Π
[
pi − Rdθ(pi)
]
dH(pi|θ′)
and hence
∫
Π R
d
θ′(pi)dH(pi|θ′) ≤
∫
Π R
d
θ(pi)dH(pi|θ′), which, when combined with (23), completes
the argument.
This allows me to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Let ∆G(θ) ≡ G(φ˜d(θ))−G(φ˜z∗(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ. Under Assumption 1, ∆G(θ) is decreasing
in θ.
Proof. First, observe that φ˜z∗(θ) is increasing in θ by MLRP. Moreover, G(φ) is concave by As-
sumption 1. Therefore, the result from Lemma 3 that ∆φ˜(θ) ≡ φ˜d(θ)− φ˜z∗(θ) is decreasing in θ
implies that
∆G(θ) ≡ G(φ˜d(θ))− G(φ˜z∗(θ))
is also decreasing in θ, proving the lemma.
The deviating bank’s expected profits from offering {Rdθ(pi)} are given by
Πd =
∫
Θ
1{φ˜d(θ)>φ˜z∗ (θ)}(θ)G(φ˜d(θ))
∫
Π
(Rdθ(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ)
<
∫
Θ
1{φ˜d(θ)>φ˜z∗ (θ)}(θ)G(φ˜d(θ))
∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ) (24)
since
∫
Π R
d
θ(pi)dH(pi|θ) <
∫
Π Rz∗(pi)dH(pi|θ) whenever φ˜d(θ) > φ˜z∗(θ) by (22). Aggregate profits
in the proposed equilibrium are
Π∗ =
∫
Θ
G(φ˜z∗(θ))
∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ) = 0 (25)
by (5), and therefore, subtracting (25) from (24) yields
Πd <
∫
Θ
(
1{φ˜d(θ)>φ˜z∗ (θ)}(θ)G(φ˜d(θ))− G(φ˜z∗(θ))
) ∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ)
=
∫
Θ
(
∆G(θ)− 1{φ˜d(θ)=φ˜z∗ (θ)}(θ)G(φ˜z∗(θ))
) ∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ) (26)
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The following two lemmas establish that the RHS of (26) is non-positive.
Lemma 5. In equation (26), ∫
Θ
∆G(θ)
∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ) ≤ 0. (27)
Proof. Find θ˜ such that
∫
Π(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ˜) = 0, which exists and is unique by (5) and MLRP.
Also, find the constant δ such that δG(φ˜z∗(θ˜)) = ∆G(θ˜). Then since ∆G(θ) is decreasing and
δG(φ˜z∗(θ)) is increasing by Lemma 4, δG(φ˜z∗(θ)) ≤ ∆G(θ) for all θ ≤ θ˜, and δG(φ˜z∗(θ)) ≥ ∆G(θ)
otherwise. Thus,
∫ θ˜
θ
∆G(θ)
∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ) +
∫ θ
θ˜
∆G(θ)
∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ)
≤
∫ θ˜
θ
δG(φ˜z∗(θ))
∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ) +
∫ θ
θ˜
δG(φ˜z∗(θ))
∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ)
= 0, (28)
where the inequality follows from
∫
Π(Rz∗(pi) − I)dH(pi|θ) < 0 for θ ≤ θ˜ and
∫
Π(Rz∗(pi) −
I)dH(pi|θ) ≥ 0 otherwise, and the equality from (5).
Lemma 6. In equation (26),∫
Θ
1{φ˜d(θ)=φ˜z∗ (θ)}(θ)G(φ˜z∗(θ))
∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ) ≥ 0. (29)
Proof. There are 3 cases to be considered. If φ˜d(θ) = φ˜z∗(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, then (29) holds with
equality due to (5). If there does not exist a θ ∈ Θ such that φ˜d(θ) = φ˜z∗(θ), then (29) also holds
as an equality trivially. Finally, if φ˜d(θ) = φ˜z∗(θ) holds for some but not all θ ∈ Θ, there must
exist some threshold value θˆ ∈ (θ, θ) such that φ˜d(θ) > φ˜z∗(θ) for all θ < θˆ and φ˜d(θ) = φ˜z∗(θ)
otherwise. This follows from Lemma 3, which has shown that ∆φ˜(θ) is decreasing in θ and, by the
definition in (22), φ˜d(θ) ≥ φ˜z∗(θ). With this, (29) becomes
∫ θ
θˆ
G(φ˜z∗(θ))
∫
Π
(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ)dF(θ) > 0
since θˆ > θ and
∫
Π(Rz∗(pi)− I)dH(pi|θ) is increasing in θ by MLRP.
Lemmas 5 and 6 together with equation (26) show that Πd < 0, and hence there does not exist
a profitable deviation.
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